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~ l. SUI~RY: 
Federal/Civil Timely 
The question presented is whether the SEC's 
authority under § 12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ~~~ 
.. ~.Jo~_k. .~ ., -~L· · summarily to suspend trading in a security for a 10-day 
~'h period includes the power to issue consecutive suspension 
~ v~ orders, the effect of which is to suspend all trading for 
~~s<>cJ.~v~ 
JA~~~ · . periods of extended duration. There is a question of mootness. 
Ov..~~~~~ 
~ 2. STATUTORY BACKGROUND: In§ 19(a) (4) of the Securities 
~_J[]xchange Act of 19 34, Congress gave the SEC the power "summarily 
i ~ c.e.~l· 
~J)~ to suspend trading in any registered security on any national 
securities exchange for a period not exceeding ten days," "if 
( 
in its opinion the public interest so requires." In 1964 this 
authority was extended to over-the-counter securities by enact-
ment of former § 15{c) {5) of the Act, 78 Stat. 574, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78o{c) {5) (1970 ed.). In 1975 the two provisions were con-
solidated into the present § 12{k) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
78l{k) {Supp. V), which provides in part: 
"If in its opinion the public interest and the pro-
tection of investors so require, the Commission is 
authorized summarily to suspend trading in any security 
(other than an exempted security) for a period not ex-
ceeding ten days, or with approval of the President, 
summarily to suspend all trading on any national securities 
exchange or otherwise, in securities other than exempted 
securities, for a period not exceeding ninety days ....• " 
Consistently since 1944, the SEC has construed its authority 
' ( to permit issuance of successive 10-day suspension orders which 
have the effect of suspending trading for a continuous period 
in excess of 10 days, where such orders are thought necessary 
to protect the investing public. According to the SEC, this 
power was used to create suspensions of more than 10 days 29 ~ 
times between 1944 and 1964. Between 1964 and November, 1976, -r~ 
the SEC has used the consecutive suspension device to 
trading for more than 10 days~less tha:_235 - t~ 
3. FACTS: On April 29, 1975, the SEC suspended 
suspend __ A 
/~
for 10 days 
public trading in the stock of Canadian Javelin, Ltd. (CJL), a 
Canadian corporation in which resp had extensive dealings and 
in which he owned stock. Simultaneously, the SEC launched an 
investigation into allegations of manipulative activities by 
CJL insiders. At the end of the first suspension period the 
SEC concluded that continued suspension was appropriate and 
imposed a second 10-day suspension. Successive determinations 
and suspensions were imposed for 370 days, until the suspensions 




On April 23, 1976, while the suspension was still in force, 
resp brought an appeal before CA 2. The SEC had previously 
declined to grant resp a hearing or to agree with his claims 
that the practice of imposing successive suspension orders violated 
both the Act and his due process rights. By the time of CA 2's 
decision on November 18, 1976, all suspension orders against CJL 
had terminated, and the SEC had no plans to issue further orders 
against CJL in the future. Although no class had been sought or 
certified, CA 2 found a live controversy under the "capable of 
repetition yet evading review" rubric of Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 
393. 
Turning to the merits, CA 2 found that there was sufficient 
evidence of manipulation of CJL stock to justify the original 
10-day suspension. But the court went on to hold that the Act 
did not authorize the practice of successive summary 10-day ____________________ , __________________________________________ _ 
suspensions." CA 2 buttressed its view with reference to another 
section of the Act which authorizes the SEC to suspend regis-
tration of a security for a period not exceeding 12 months, after 
notice and hearing, if the SEC finds that "the issuer of such 
security has failed to comply with any provision of this title 
1/ This was the second series of suspensions the SEC had 
Imposed on trading in CJL stock, the first having run from 
November, 1973, through January, 1975. Resp had challenged these 
earlier suspension orders before CA 2, but for a number of 
reasons the CA had dismissed resps's appeal without prejudice so 
that further proceedings could be had before the SEC. See Pet. 
Sa-~Oa. The present petition arises from that remand. 
c 
1 




Viewing the statutory scheme as a whole, CA 2 thought 
Congress did not intend the 10-day summary suspension procedure 
to be used as a device to evade the more stringent procedural 
requirements established for suspensions of greater duration. 
In its opinion, the 10-day suspension order was designed for 
emergency use; the Act provided no authority for successive 
10-day suspension orders. Accordingly, the SEC was ordered "to 
discontinue forthwith its adoption and use of successive ten-day 
suspension orders to order the suspension of trading in a 
security for an extended period, i.e., in excess of ten days." 
Pet. 17a. There was no need to reach any due process question. 
4. CONTENTIONS: The SG first contends that CA 2 erred -
s~ /.J.OAff 
~ 
in not dismissing the petition as m~ot; there was no reasonable 
expectation that CJL would again be subjected to a 10-day sus-
pension order, and the case is therefore not one capable of 
repetition yet evading review. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 
u.s. 14 7. 
On the merits, the SG complains that CA 2 has crippled one 
of the SEC's principal tools for protecting the investing public, 
and has overturned 33 years of administrative practice. The SG" 
2/ CA 2 also pointed to the provision of § 12(k), quoted 
supra, which permits 90-day summary suspensions of trading, "on 
any national securities exchange or otherwise," "with the 
approval of the President." CA 2 devoted a good deal of atten-
tion to the 90-day suspension provision of § 12(k). On the 
SEC's petition for rehearing, however, all this discussion was 
deleted as unnecessary, see Pet. 18a-20a, apparently because 
CA 2 thought the 90-day suspension applied only to trading of 
securities on a national exchange. The SG does not mention the 
90-day provision as part of the SEC's remedial arsenal available 
in this case. 
I 
notes that the Senate Report accompanying the 1964 extension of 
the suspension authority to over-the-counter sales expressed 
approval of the SEC's practice: 
"The Commission has consistently construed section 
19(a) (4) as permitting it to issue more than one suspension 
if, upon reexamination at the end of the 10-day period, 
it determines that another suspension is necessary. ·· 
The committee accepts this interpretation." S. Rep. No. 
379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1963). 
The SG argues that the normal judicial deference to the SEC's 
o.uf~orify 
construction of its own statutoryl'is enhanced where Congress 
has reenacted a statute without disapproving the agency's con-
struction, as Congress did here in 1964 and 1975. The SG 
contends that the 12-month suspension-of-registration provision 
is designed for use only where there is misconduct by the issuer 
of securities; it is therefore not available as an alternative 
in cases in which the question is manipulation by third parties, 
and was not intended by Congress to be a preferred remedy in 
. cases of this sort. Although there is no conflict among the 
CAs, the SG says that New York's position as the Nation's 
financial center makes CA 2's error certworthy. 
5. DISCUSSION: If the case was not moot when CA 2 
decided it, it is because "there was a reasonable expectation 
that [CJL] would be subjected to the same action again." 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S., at 149. I see no basis for 
concluding that there was any such expectation at the time CA 2 
issued its opinion; I therefore think this case is a candidate 
for summary reversal on the strength of Weinstein. I think res~s 
private ownership of CJL common stock confers standing on him 
to seek review in this case. 
r 
On the merits, one important measure of the correctness 
of CA 2's decision is the extent to which alternative remedies 
are available for the misconduct which· would justify a 10-day 
summary suspension. The 1975 Senate Report accompany § 12(j) 
of the Act (providing for the 12-month suspension) states that 
"the Commission is expected to use this section rather than its 
ten-day suspension power in cases of extended duration." Senate 
Report No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), p. 105-106. 
It is not clear, however, that the 10-day and 12-month sus-
pension provisions are meant to be graduated responses to 
precisely the same problems. A 12-month suspension is available 
only if the issuer of a security has violated the security laws, 
while the 10-day suspension is available for broader purposes. 
Moreover, the 12-month suspension holds up registration of securities, 
while the 10-day suspension bars trading; brokers are prohibited 
from using any means of interstate commerce to effect or induce 
transaction~ of securities suspended under either section. In 
light of these differences, the Senate Report for§ 12(j) may best 
be read as expressing a preference for the 12-month suspension pro-
cedure only in a limited class of cases, in which both suspensions 
apply. 
Even if the SEC is overworking its summary suspension power 
when it ought to be using a remedy with more procedural safeguards, 
CA 2 may have devised a cure worse than the disease. There may 
well be situations where consecutive 10-day suspensions of 
tr~ding in securities offer the only effective protection for 
private investors. So long as each suspension is preceded by an 
SEC determination that a continued trading embargo is necessary, as 
well as a finding that no alternate remedy is feasible to deal 
with the problem, at least some limited consecutive 
suspensions appear to have been contemplated by Congress. If 
the Court is not daunted by the mootness problem, the long-
standing administrative practice to the contrary appears to make 
this a certworthy case. 
There is no response. 
6/30/77 
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, o s t at moo s not a bar 
where short-term administrative orders, 
which may be repeated successively, have 
expired. ( !u.-vts c,~rr•e--1:} 
(2) The SEC cannot "bootstrap" itself 
into a position of exercising power it 
never received under the statute merely 
because C~ngress has not taken affirmative 
steps to restrict those ultra vires acts. 
Nor is this a case in which the agency is 
interpreting its own regulations, such 
as Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,395 U.S. 367 
(1969). 
(3)- Nevertheless, the Court should grant 
cert. ~ The SEC is making noises indicating 
that it does not consider its~ef bound to 
adhere to the order of the CA 2 to refrain 
'
from issuing successive orders. Therefore, 
this Court ought to make clear that the 
agency has n~ such power. 
(4) If the Court does not accept 
Resp's statutory argument -- upheld by the 
Court below -- then it must consider the 
due process iSsues presented and strike 
the SEC practice sown on that bases. 
I a~ree with Dave's concmusion tht 
the case ~s not moot, although some argument 
and priefing on the point would not hurt, 
in tl;le event of a grant. a,.~ 
i\\c~Hs c.J•se. Gr...t' ~
.. ,, 
J,C/lz.5 ~ 
' 'r 4.1-s 5 c c::: .s- d-~ 
k 1 ~ r~~~~~ 
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~~~~~~. 




2. CA2-I Sf'~~~ 
~~:· -'fw.L 
ti • 











.... __ __:__:· 0 Oo. 0 
I' Utt:U U'fl 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Assigned 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• , 
....... , 19... . . '"· .. 
::::===========A~n=ntoo'cunced ::::::: · · · · · 
0 
• • ., 19 ... . . .  • 0 • • • ,  0 
.... •• 0 • 0. 0. 0. 0 ., 19.0. 








No. 76-1607 SEC v. Sloan 
This case presents the question whether the SEC 
has the power under §12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, which permits the Commission summarily to suspend 
trading in a security for a period not exceeding then days, 
to "tack" ten-day suspensions for the same abuse into -.. - -prolonged suspensions of more than a year's duration. 
There is also an issue of mootness. 
I think the case should not be held moot, either 
under the doctrine of Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 
219 U.S. 498 (1911), or that of United States v. W.T. Grant 
Co., 345 u.s. 629 (1953). On the merits, a sensible 
reading of §12(k) and other provisions in the '34 Act 
2. 
seems to support the view of the court 'below; which held 
~ - --·-·------- ------.. .......... 
that the SEC lacked power to issue successive ten-day 
orders on the basis of the same perceived harm. 
The SG's brief and the brief of Canadian Javelin, 
Ltd., as Amicus Curiae are both quite good, although the 
latter gets a bit wordy. I doubt that you will find ~~ 
Sloan's 173-page pro se brief very helpful. But because 
the other two seem to cover all the issue adequatly, this 
memo will merely hit the highlights. 
I 
MOOTNESS 
The SEC argues that this case is moot because the 
last of the ten=-day suspension orders expired in May 
1976. There were two series of these orders. The first 
commenced in November 1973 and ended in January 1975. It 
came in response to certain false and misleading press 
releases concerning Canadian Javelin's business 
activities . Sloan filed a petition for review of these 
orders, alleging that he had sold short and that the 
allegedly illegal ban prevented him from covering his short 
position. By the time CA2 heard argument in this case, the 
Drders 
first series of ••ii:I'Qis had terminated, but the second had 
begun. The second series came in response to a Canadian 
investigation into wash sale trading by some of Javelin's 
shareholders. (This series lasted from April 1975 to May 
,, 
3. 
1976). CA2 noted that the series of orpers of which Sloan 
complained had expired and that there was nothing in the 
record concerning the second series. It also observed that 
the SEC had indicated its willingness to grant Sloan some 
sort of an administrative hearing concerning the second set 
of orders, which might flesh out the record. It therefore 
dismissed Sloan's petition for review without prejudice to 
repleading after the administrative hearing. 
Sloan requested the SEC to refrain from issuing 
any more suspension orders pending an administrative 
hearing. The SEC refused to grant him the hearing and 
continued issuing the orders. 
Sloan then initiated this suit by petitioning for 
review of the second series of orders. Once again, the SEC 
stopped its issuance of the orders before CA2 could heu the 
case. The court rejected the SEC's mootness claim, 
however, by holding the orders "capable of repetition , yet 
evading review," under Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. 
ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 514-515 (1911) . In that case, the 
IC~ssued an order requiring the terminal to cease and 
desist for a period of two years from granting undue 
preferences to a particular shipper. Before this Court 
could review the order, the two years had elapsed. The 
Court refused to hold the case moot, because otherwise 
review of such orders might be defeated. 
'--·· 
4 . 
Although Southern Pacific Terminal did not appear 
to rest on any finding that this particular type of order 
would likely be entered against this particular petitioner 
again, later cases added such a requirement. In Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court declared that the 
petitioner might become pregnant again; hence, "repetition" 
was likely. And in Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 u.s. 147 • 
(1975), the Court read Sosna v. Iowa as setting forth two 
requirements for application of the "capable of repetiton, 
yet evading review" evidence in the absence of a class 
action: (1) the challenged action's duration must be too 
short to permit full litigation before expiration; and (2) 
a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party 
will be subjected to the same action again. Because 
Bradford had not demonstrated that North Carolina's parole 
system might ever again be applied to him, his due process 
claim was dismissed as moot. 
A very harsh reading of Bradford might support a 
refusal to find the SEC's orders here "capable of 
repe titon, yet evading review." Sloan has not put any 
evidence in the record regarding the likelihood that 
a,-.{"' 
Canadian Javelin will be subjectedAto the orders. Nor has 
he worked through the probability theory the SG wants him 
to follow with respect to other stocks in his portfolio. 
------------------. ____ ...,5. 
A very hearsh reading of Bradf6rd ,6gjt support 
refusal to find the SEG~s orders here "capable of 
repetition, yet view." Sloan has not put any 
.... · 
evidence in- the record the likelihood ~ t~at 
Canadiad Javelin will be ~ubjected to the orders. Nor ha 
/ 
h worked through the probability theory the SG wants him 
to follow with respect to other stocks in his portfolio. 
In common sense terms, however, such a reading of 
Braford seems too harsh. The SEC's use of §l2(k) in this 
manner is not at all uncommon. See Amicus' Appendix. In 
actuality, Javelin was subjected to t wo sets of these 
orders. Moreover, one of Sloan's complaints was that he 
was trapped in a short position. As Amicus points out, Br. 
at 9 n. 8, the same thing could happen in the future with 
respect to stocks he does not even now own. This 
distinguishes the case from Bradford, where future criminal 
activity by Bradford would have to be presumed in order to 
find likelihood of repetition. Here, perfectly legitimate 
and ongoing activity could lead to repetition. Finally, 
such a harsh reading of Bradford would cast doubt on the 
holding of Roe v. Wad~, since that case did not require any 
particular actuarial showing that women pregnant in 1970 
(the time of the class complaint) would again become 
pregnant. I think the mootness judgment should turn on 
'--------------------------~  common sense, rather than on often misleading faith in the -----------
precision of probability theory. Cf. I3a.llew v. Georgia. 
Even if the "capable of repetition, yet evading 
review" doctrine is held not to apply, United States v. 
W.T. Grant Co., 345 u.s. 629 (1953), seems to support a 
holding that the case is not moot. In that case, the 
Government sued an individual and six corporations from 
violating the Clayton Act through the holding of 
interlocking directorates. After the complaint was filed, 
the interlocks were dissolved, and the defendants moved to 
dismiss as moot. Even though the District Court ha·d found 
that there was not "the slightest threat that the 
defendants [would] attempt any future" violations, this 
Court held the case not moot. Otherwise, the defendants 
could always avoid law enforcement, yet remain free to 
return to their old ways. Moreover, there was a public 
interest in having the legality of the practices settled. 
6 0 
The same is true here. There surely is a public 
interest in having the legality of the SEC's practices 
under §12(k) settled. And if the SEC can always stave off 
review by terminating the series of orders prior to 
judicial review, it will remain free to engage in the 
challenged conduct without fear of oversight. Moreover, on 
these facts, it looks as though this is precisely what the 
SEC attempted to accomplish. Both series of orders expired 
just before CA2 considered Sloan's petitions. 
7. 
If this case is held moot, it .is hard to see how 
the issue will ever become subject to review, except for 
the grace of the SEC. 
II 
SEC POWER UNDER §12(k) 
The Amicus' Brief does a pretty good job of 
responding to the SG's arguments on the merits. I will 
emphasize only a couple of points. 
First, §12(j) permits the SEC to suspend ..... .,.. 
registration for a period not exceeding 12 months, but only 
after notice and hearing. It is hard to believe that 
Congress intended to permit the SEC to avoid the hearing 
requirement -and the time limit -of 12(k) -by resort to 
trading suspension orders under §12(k). Professor Loss, -whom the SG quotes at length for descriptions of the SEC 
practice, raises this issue in a section of his treatise 
not included in the SG's excerpt (§19 (a) (2) was the 
predecessor of §l2(k): 
The more serious question of statutory authorit 
to do this arises not from one suspens1on onto 
another in the event of an emergency lasting more 
than ten days, but from the gradual evolution of 
this emergency power - not used at all during the 
first seven years of the Commission's life - into 
the pendente lite suspension power which is 
lacking under §19 (a) (2). By 1959 the Chairman 
found it possible to say, by way of explaining a 
legislative proposal to insert a ~ndente lite 
suspenion power [§19 (a) (4)] has been used to 
J 
"-....-· 
keep in effect a suspension of trading pending 
final disposition of delisting proceedings," 
although "No express authority for such action is 
contained in Section 19 (a) (4)." In at least one 
of the most recent of the seven cases in which 
suspension orders accompanied the institution of 
delisting proceedings, the suspension order is 
quite bare of any emergency findings. The 
pendente lite suspension power with respect to 
broker-dealer registration §15(b) not only stands 
in marked contrast to §19 (a) (2) - though, to be 
snre, §15(b) was enacted two years later- but . 
also requires "appropriate notice and opportunity 
for hearing." And the similar power which was 
proposed to be added to §19 (a) (2) in the 1959 
legislative program would have required a prompt 
hearing, on the issuer's request, as to the 
continuation of the suspension. 
2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 854-855 (2d ed. 196~). 
8. 
In his 1969 Supplement, Loss cites the 1963 Senate 
Report, quoted at pp. 27-28 of the SG's Brief, as some 
evidence that Congress did contemplate a §12(k) power to 
issue orders in series. The answer to this contention, 
which Amicus makes at Br. 38-3$, is that it is counter-
balanced by a statement in a ~Senat~R~dealing 
with the recodification of the suspension powers into the 
preset §12 (j) and of §12 (k) , to the effect that "the 
Commission is expected to use [§12(j) -suspension of 
registration] rather than its ten-day suspension power in 
cases of extended duration." The legislative history being 
in equipoise, I think we are free to examine the logic of 
the statute. 
The logic of the statute seems to favor Sloan's 
position. As noted above, in view of the procedural 
t •. 
protections built into §l2(j), it is difficult to accept 
the SEC's contention that §12(k) authorizes complete 
suspension of trading for periods up to 13 years) ~e 
Amicus' App. at la, without some kind of protections for 
the corporation and its shareholders. Moreover, there are 
no statutory guidelin~s as to what circumstances warrant 
imposition of protracted series of orders, and the 
Commission has published no regulations suggesting how its 
discretion will be guided. The elastic phrases "public 
interest" and "protection of investors" in§ 12(k) 
certainly provide little guidance. In effect, the SEC's 
discretion is unreviewable. The sparse nature of the - .. ___ section lebds support to the idea that it was viewed as an 
emergency, stop-gap measure, which ordinarily would not 
need to be reviewed because it would terminate so quickly. 
The SEC has three major arguments in its favor. 
First, it contends that §l2(k) covers a broader range of 
securities than does §12(j). B~ for SEC at 29-30. Section 
12(j) covers only registered securities, while §12(k) 
I ' covers any secur1ty. Thus, says the SG, there would be a 
statutory gap - no way for the SEC to effect long-term 
suspensions of trading in unregistered securities. This 
may be true, but it also may be true that Congress simply 
was not as concerned about manipulations of unregistered 
securities. Moreover, the argument proves too much, 
9. 
'-·· 
because an ironic consequence} of usin,g _§l2(k) 





obviate~ any resort to §l2(j) even for registered 
securites. In effect, §12(j) falls into desuetude. 
10. 
Second, the SEC argues that §12(j) reaches only 
) 
issuer misconduct, while §l2(k) can be used to halt trading 
even where third-party manipulations are involved. Once 
again it might be answered that Congress well may have been 
more concerned with the former ev/il than the latter. 
Furthermore, it seems backwards to grant the SEC power to 
suspend trading for long periods, without hearings, when 
third-party conduct is involved, and yet to create 
procedural ~tection via §12(j) when suspected issuer 
misconduct i9 p resen t. When the issuer itself is culpable, 
at least it can be held partially accountable for the 
predicament into which suspension flings it. The 
shareholders - on a traditional representation theory - are 
stuck with the board and its management, which presumably 
engaged in the misconduct. When suspension results from 
how c.11er, 
third-party conduct, the issuer and its shareholders are 
" frozen in limbo through no fault of their own. One would 
expect more procedural protection in the latter situation. 
Yet in the SEC's reading of the statute , the issuer gets 
M\f,cNtvc:.t 
procedural protections for charges of its ownAin suspension 
proceedings under §l2(j), but gets no protection when 
trading is suspended on account of thir~~party misconduct 
e 
11. 
under §12{k). The lik~ier inference would seem to be that 
Congress did not feel that procedural protections were 
necessary under §l2{k) because it did not believe §12{k) 
would be used to freeze the issuer and its shareholders in 
limbo for extended periods, as could be the case under 
§12{j). 
Third, the SEC argues, Br. 31-32, that its 
interpretation of §12{k) is necessary to furnish a pendente 
lite suspension power. If Congress had wished to create 
such a pendente lite power in connection with §l2{j) 
proce edings or injunction suits, it could have done so 
quite explicitly. Indeed, it was the transformation of 
§12{k) 's predecessor into such a pendente lite suspension 
statute that Profes s or Los s que stion in 1961. Se e, p. ~--
supra. One would think that if Congress tended to create 
such a power, it would at least have created some sort of a 
preliminary injunction s tandard {like lihood that SEC will 
prevail on merits) that would have to be met before a 
long- term suspe nsion Ee nd e nte lite could be 4pproved. 
One could r ea sona bly come out the other way, but I 
do not believe that the SEC's arguments carry the day. 
R.C. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. 70-1607 
Securities and Exchange] . 
Commission Petitioner Ou Wnt of Certiorari to the United 
' ' States Court of Appeals for the 
v. Second Circuit. 
Samuel H. Sloan. 
'[May -, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE RE:HNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.~~ 
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 the Securities ~ _. _ _i ~ ~A . 
and Exchange Commission has the authority "summarily to -,~-­
suspend trading in any security ... for a period not exceeding ~ Ji er ~ 
ten days" if "in its opinion the public interest and the pro-
tection of investors so require." 1 Acting pursuant to this ~ 
1 This authority is presently found in § 12 (k) of the Act, which was .-,~ 
added by amendment in 1975 by Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 9, 89 Stat. 118. It 1/77. . ~ r-'..,., 
provides in pertinent part: / ~ 5 C:G 
"If in its opinion the public interest and the protection of investors so 
require, the Commission is authorized summarily to suspend trailing in any 
security (other than an exempted ;:;ecurity) for a period not exceeding ten 
days . . . . No member of a national securities exchange, broker, or dealer 
shall make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce to effect any tran~<artion in, or to induce the purchase or sale of, 
any security in which trailing is so su~:;pended." 15 U. S. C. (Supp. V) 
§ 78l (k). 
This power was previous!~· found in §§ 15 (c) (5) and 19 (a.) (4) of the Act, 
which for all purposes relevant to this ca¢e were substantially identical to 
the current statute,§ 12 (k) , except that§ 15 (c)(5) authorized summary 
suspension of trading in securitiPs which werE' traded in the over-the-counter 
market, while § 19 (a) ( 4) permitted summfLry suspension of trading in 
10ecnrit.ies which werr tradPd on tlw national exchanges. 15 U.S. C. §§ 78o 
(c)(5) and 78s (a)(4) (1970 ed.). Congress con~olidat.ed those powers 
in § 12 (k) . 
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authority the Commission issued a series of consecutive orders 
suspending trading in the common stock of Canadian Javelin 
Ltd. ("CJL") for over a year. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that such a series of suspensions was 
beyond the scope of the Commission's statutory authority. 547 
F. 2d 152, 157-158 (1976) . We granted certiorari to consider 
this important question, - U. S. - ( 1977), and, finding our-
selves in basic agreement with the Court of Appeals, we affirm. 
We hold that even though there be a periodic redetermination 
of whether such action is required by "the public interest" 
and for "the protection of investors," the Commission is not 
empowered to issue, based upon a single set of circumstances, a 
series of summa.ry orders which would suspend trading beyond 
the initial10-day period. 
I 
On November 29. 1973. apparently because CJL had dissem-
inated allegedly false and misleading press releases concerning 
certain of its business activities, the Commission issued the 
first of what was to become a series of summary 10-day 
suspension orders continuously suspending trading in CJL 
common stock from that date until January 26, 1975. App. 
109. During this series of suspensions respondent Sloan, who 
owned 13 shares of CJL stock and had engaged in substantial 
purchases and short sales of shares of that stock, filed a peti-
tion in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit challenging the orders on a variety of grounds. On 
October 15, 1975, the court dismissed as frivolous all respond-
ent's claims, except for his allegation that the "tacking" of 
10-day summary suspension orders for an indefinite period 
was an abuse of the agency's authority and a deprivation of 
due process. It further concluded, however, that in light of 
two events which had occurred prior to argument, it could not 
address this question at that time. The first event of sig-
nificance was the resumption of trading on January 26, 1975. 
The second was the commencement of a second series of 
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summary 10-day suspension orders. This series began on 
April 29, 1975, when the Commission issued a 10-day order 
based on the fact that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
had launched an extensive investigation into alleged manipula-
tion of CJL common stock on the American Stock Exchange 
and several Canadian stock exchanges. App. 11-12. This 
time 37 separate orders were issued, suspending trading con-
tinuously from April 29, 1975, to May 2, 1976. The court 
thought the record inadequate in light of these events and 
dismissed respondent's appeal "without prejudice to his re-
pleading after an administrative hea.ring before the SEC ... ," 
which hearing, though apparently not required by statute or 
regulation, had been offered by the Commission at oral argu-
ment. 527 F. 2d 11, 12 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 
935 (1976). 
Thereafter respondent immediately petitioned the Commis-
sion for the promised hearing. The hearing was not forth-
coming, however, so on April23, 1976, during the period when 
the second series of orders was still in effect, respondent 
brought the present action pursuant to § 25 (a) of the Act, 
15 U. S. C. § 78y (a)(1), challenging the second series of 
suspension orders. He argued, among other things, that there 
was no rational basis for the suspension orders, that they were 
not supported by substantial evidence in any event, and that 
the "tacking" of 10-day summary suspension orders was 
beyond the Commission's authority because the statute specif-
ically authorized suspension "for a period not exceeding ten 
days." 2 The court held in respondent's favor on this latter 
point. It first concluded that despite the fact that there had 
been no 10-day suspension order in effect since May 2, 1976, 
and the Commission had asserted that it had no plans to 
2 Respondent also argued that the order,; violated his due process rights 
becaut~e he was n<>ver giv<>n notice and an opportunity for a hea,ring and 
that § 12 (k) was an uncon:-<titutional delegation of legislative power. The 
court found it unnecessary to address these issues. 
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consider or issue an order against CJL in the foreseeable future, 
the case was not moot because it was " 'capable of repetition 
yet evading review.'" 547 F. 2d, at 158, quoting from 
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911). 
The court then decided tha.t the statutes which authorized 
summary suspensions-§ 12 (k) and its predecessors-did not 
empower the Commission to issue successive orders to curtail 
trading in a security for a period beyond the initial 10-day 
period. Id., at 157-158. We granted certiorari, specifically 
directing the attention of the parties to the question of 
mootness,- U. S.- (1977), to which we now turn. 
II 
The Commission does not urge that the case is demonstrably 
moot, but rather that there simply are not enough facts on the 
record to allow a proper determination of mootness. It argues 
that there is no "reasonable expectation" that respondent will 
be harmed by further suspensions because, " 'the investing 
public now ha[ ving] been apprised of the relevant facts, the 
concealment of which had threatened to disrupt the market in 
CJL stock, there is no reason to believe that it will be necessary 
to suspend trading again.' " Brief for Petitioner 15, quoting 
from Pet. for Cert. 12 n. 7. Cf. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 
U. S. 147. 149 (1975). The Commission concedes, howevet, 
that respondent, in his capacity as a diversified investor, might 
be harmed in the future by the suspension of some other 
security which he owns. But it further contends that respond-
ent has not provided enough data about the number or type 
or securities in his portfolio to enable the Court to determine 
whether there is a "reasonable" likelihood that a security 
which he owns will be subjected to consecutive summary 
suspension orders.3 Respondent, on the other hand, argues 
3 The Commission contends that to determine the mathematical proba,. 
bility that at least one of the securities held by respondent will be subjected 
to consecutive suspension orders it is necessary to know, in addition to 
' . 
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that this case is not moot because, as the Court of Appeals 
observed, it is "capable of repetition yet evading review." He 
further contends that he has suffered collateral legal conse-
quences from the series of f1Uspension orders, and thus the case 
is not moot. Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,57 (1968). 
We find it unnecessary to address respondent's second con-
tention or to undertake the Commission's suggested analysis 
of mootnes because this case falls squarely within the general 
principle first enunciated in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. 
ICC, supra, and further clarified in Weinstein v. Bradford, 
supra, that even in the absence of a class action a case is not 
moot when "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too 
short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, 
and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same com-
plaining party would be subjected to the same action again." 
Weinstein v. Bradford, supra, at 147 (emphasis added). A 
series of consecutive suspension orders may last no more than 
20 days, making effective judicial review impossible during 
the life of the orders, and thus satisfying the first part of the 
test. And, to put it Ihildly, CJL has a history of sailing close 
to the wind:' Thus, the Commission's protestations to the 
other information ndmittedly available in the Commission's own records, 
'tho number of publicly traded corporations of which respondent is a 
shareholder. This datum cannot be ascertained with any accuracy on this 
record, however, claims the Commission, because respondent has made 
va,rious repre:-;rntations regarding that number at various stages of the 
litiga.tion. C£. App. 153 with Brief in Opposit.ion 18. The Commission 
adds that the probability could be determined with even greater accuracy 
if rcspondrnt revealed the nature of his portfolio because certain securities-
t.l10:-;e listed on thr New York Stock Exchange, for example-are seldom 
Rmmna rily suspended. 
4 Within the Ialit five years the Commission has twice issued a series of 
ordrrR, r.'lch of which suspended t.rading in CJL stock for over a year. In 
the various staff reports given to the Commission in connection with and 
attached to the Hecond series of orders, the Division of Enforcement 
indicates in no letis than six ~;eparate reports that either the Commission or 
Hte various stock exchanges view CJL as a "chronic vicMator .. ,.. App. 20" 
' ' 
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contrary notwithstanding, there is a reasonable probability 
that CJL stock will again be subjected to consecutive summary 
suspension orders. Accordingly, respondent, who apparently 
still owns CJL stock, very well may suffer the same type of 




Turning to the merits, we note that this is not a case where 
the Commission, discovering the existence of a manipulative 
scheme affecting CJL stock, suspended trading for 10 days and 
then, upon the discovery of a second manipulative scheme or 
other improper activity unrelated to the first scheme, ordered a 
second 10-day suspension." Instead it is a case in which the 
Commission issued a series of summary suspension orders 
lasting over a year on the basis of evidence revealing a single, 
though likely sizable, manipulative scheme.0 Thus, the only 
22, 24, 26, 28, 31. And reference is madr to "1 he continuous [C.TL] 
problrms." App. 61. Furthrrmore, roun~rl for the Commission repre-
Hented at. oral argument that there werr in fact three separate bases for 
the oecond serir~ of Huspensions-aJleged market manipulation, ~t change in 
m:Lnngement of the company, and <L failure to file current reports. Tr. of 
Oral Arg. 17-18. 
5 Neither doe:; the fir;:t series of order,; appear to be of this type. 
Ha ther, like thr :;erond ~<erie~, it ap]war:< to he predicated mainly on one 
major improprirty on the part of C.TL and it~ pN~onnel, which impropriety 
rec]tnred thr Commission, in it~ opinion, to i~sut' a rea.r long Reries of 
l:ntrnma.ry su:;pension order" to protect investor,; :u1d for the public interest. 
n As indirated above, see ante, n. 4, the Commi~ion advances three 
;;epa.mte reason::; for the ~u~pent<ions , thu~ im]llicitl~· ~ugge:<ting that perhaps 
tlm: iH n case where the Commi~:>ion di;;cov<'red independ!'nt reasons to 
SUl:!))('nd trndin~ after the initial HU~>penl:'ion. We note firl:!t that there are 
doubts whether the"e "rea.~ons" indPpendentl~· would have justified suspen-
:->JOn . For example. we doubt the Commi~;:;ion regula rl~· ::;u:,;pends trading 
becau::;e of a " chan~e in ma.nagPment ." A susprn~ion might be justified if 
managemE-nt. st<'p,.; down under ;;uspiciou,.; <"ircum;;tancp,;, but thr f;Uspirious 
C'lrcumHtanrr here iR the initial rea:;on advanced for su;.:pcnsion-the 
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question confronting us is whether, even upon a periodic 
redetermination of "necessity," the Commission is statutorily 
authorized to issue a series of summary suspension orders 
based upon a single set of events or circumstances which 
threaten an orderly market. This question must, in our 
opinion, be answered in the negative. 
The first and most salient point leading us to this conclusion 
is the language of the statute. Section 12 (k) authorizes the 
Commission "summarily to suspend trading in any security ... 
for a period not exceeding ten days .... " 15 U. S. C. (Supp. 
V) ~ 781 (,K) (emphasis added). The Commission would 
have us read the underscored phrase as a limita.tion only upon 
the duration of a single suspension order. So read, the Com-
mission could indefinitely suspend trading in a security 
without any hearing or other procedural safeguards as long as 
it redetermined every 10 days that suspension wa.s required by 
the public interest and for the protection of investors. While 
perhaps not an impossible reading of the statute, we are 
persuaded it is not the most natural or logical one. The dura-
tion limitation rather appears on its face to be just that-a 
maximum time period for which trading can be suspended for 
any single set of circumstances. 
Apart from the language of the statute, which we find 
persuasive in and of itself, there are other reasons to adopt 
this construction of the statute. In the first place, the power 
to summarily suspend trading in a security even for 10 days, 
without any notice, opportunity to be heard or findings based 
manipulative scheme-and thus the change in management can hardly be 
considered an independent justification for suspension. More importantly, 
however, even assuming the exif\tence of three independent reasons for 
suspension, that leaves 34 suspension order::; that were not based on 
independent reason.s and thus the question still remains. Does the statute 
empower the Commission to continue to "roll-over" suspension orders for 
the same allegedly improper activity simply upon a redeterminat.ion that 
the continued suspension JH " required" by the public intf'rest. and for the 
protectiOn of investors? 
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upon a record, is an awesome power with a potentially 
devastating impact on the issuer, its shareholders, and other 
investors. A clear mandate from Congress, such as that found 
in ~ 12 (k), is necessary to confer this power. No less clear a 
mandate can be expected from Congress to authorize the 
Commission to extend, virtually without limit. these periods 
of suspension. But we find no such unmistakable mandate in 
§ 12 (k). Indeed. if anything, that section points in the 
opposite direction. 
Other sections of the statute reinforce the conclusion that 
in this area Congress considered summary restrictions to be 
somewhat drastic and properly used only for very brief periods 
of time. When explicitly long term, though perhaps tempo-
rary, measures are to be taken against some person. company 
or security, Congress invariably requires the Commission to 
give some sort of notice and opportunity to be heard. For 
example. ~ 12 ( j) of the Act authorizes the Commission, as it 
dePms necessary for the protection of investors, to suspend the 
registration of a security for a period not exceeding 12 months 
if it makes certain findings "on the record after notice and 
opportunity for hearing .... " 15 U. S. C. (Supp. V) § 78l 
(j) (emphasis added). Another section of the Act empowers 
the Commission to suspend broker-dealer registration for a 
period not exceeding 12 months upon certain findings made 
only "on the record after notice and opportunity for hearing." 
15 U. S. C. (Supp. V) ~ 78o ( 4) (emphasis added). Still an-
otlwr section allows the Commission, pending final determina-
tion whether a broker-dealer's registration should be revoked, 
to temporarily suspend that registration, but only "after notice 
and opportunity for hearing." 15 U.S. C. (Supp. V) § 78o (s) 
(emphasis added). Former~ 15 (b)(6), which dealt with the 
registration of broker-dealers, also lends support to the notion 
that as a general matter Congress meant to allow the Com~ 
mission to take summary action only for the period specified 
in the statute when that action is based upon any single set 
of circumstancE's. That section allowed the Commission to 
' . 
76-1607-0PINION 
SEC v. SLOAN 9 
summarily postpone the eff<:'ctivc date of registration for 15 
days, and then, after appropriate notice and opportunity for 
hearing, to continue that postpo11em<:'nt pending final resolu-
tion of the matter.' The section which replaced ~ 15 (b) (6) 
even further underscores this general pattern. It requires the 
Commission to take some action-either granting the registra-
tion or instituting proceedings to determine whether registra-
tion should be denied-within 45 days. 15 U. S. C. (Supp. V) 
§ 78o (b) (1). In light of the explicit congressional recogni-
tion in other sections of the Act, both past and present, that 
any long term sanctions or any continuation of summary 
restrictions must be accompanied by notice and an opportu-
nity for a hearing, it is difficult to read the silence in § 12 (k) 
as an authorization for an extension of summary restrictions 
without such a hearing, as the Commission contends. The 
more plausible interpretation is that Congress did not intend 
the Commission to have the power to extend the length of sus-
pensions under § 12 (k) at alL much less to repeatedly extend 
such suspensions without any hearing. 
B 
The Commission advances four arguments in support of its 
position, none of which we find persuasive. It first argues 
7 Tht> formt>r § 15 (b) (6) provided in pC'rtinf'nt part: 
'' Pendmg final d(•tC'rmination whether an~· regi<>t.ration under this subllection 
::;hall be df'nird, thr Commi~~ion may b~· order poi<tpone the effective date 
of ::;uch regil'ltmhon for a pf'riod not to cxcred fifteen chys, but if, after 
appropriate notice and opportunit~· for hearing (which may consist. solely 
of affidavit~ and oral argumC'ntti), it shall appear to the Commi<>sion to be 
nece~Hary or appropna.te in thr public interC'st or for the protection of 
invel:itOr;; to postpone the rffPrtivf' date of t'uch registration until final 
drterminat10n, the Comims,;ion :,;hall so order. Pending final determination 
whether any such rrgil:itration Hhall be rrvokrd, the Commission shall by 
ordrr sutipend ::;uch registratiOn if, aftrr appropriate notice and opportunity 
for Jwarmg, ::;uch Huspenc;ion ~hall aJ1pear to thr Commission to be 
twces<>ary or a.ppropriate in thr public intrrest or for the protection of 
investor:; .•.. " 15 U S.C. § 78o (6) (1970 eeL) . 
' . 
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that only its interpretation makes sense out of the statute. 
That is, if the Commission discovers a manipulative scheme 
and suspends trading for 10 days, surely it can suspend trading 
30 days later upon the discovery of a second manipulative 
days later upon the discovery of another manipulative scheme, 
it surely could be suspended only 10 days later if the discovery 
of the second scheme were made on the eve of the expiration 
of the first order. And, continues the Commission, since 
nothing on the face of the statute requires it to consider only 
evidence of new manipulative schemes when evaluating the 
public interest and the needs of investors, it must have the 
power to issue consecutive suspension orders even in the 
absence of a new or different manipulative scheme, as long 
as the public interest requires it. 
This argument is unpersuasive, however, because the conclu-
sion simply does not follow from the various premises. Even 
assuming the Commission can again suspend trading upon 
learning of another event which threatens the stability of the 
market, it simply does not follow that the Commission there-
fore must necessarily have the power to do so even in the 
absence of such a discovery. On its face ancl in the context of 
this statutory pattem, ~ 12 (k) is more properly viewed as a 
device to allow the Commission to take emergency action for 
10 days while it prepares to deploy its other remedies, such as 
a temporary restraining order. a prelimiuary or permanent 
injunction, or a suspension or revocation of the registration of 
a security. The Commission's argument would render unnec-
essary to a greater or lesser extent all of these other admittedly 
more cumbersome remedies which Congress has given to it. 
Closely related to the Commission's first argument is its 
second-its construction furthers the statute's remedial pur-
poses. Here the Commission merely asserts that it "has found 
that the remedial purposes of the statute require successive 
·suspension of trading in particular securities, in order to main-
' . 
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tain orderly and fair capital markets." Brief for Petitioner 37. 
Other powers granted the Commission are. in its opinion, 
simply insufficient to accomplish its purposes. 
We likewise reject this argument. In the first place, the 
Commission has not made a very persuasive showing that 
other remedies are ineffective. It argues that injunctions and 
temporary restraining orders are insufficient because they take 
time and evidence to obtain and because they can be obtained 
only against wrongdoers aud not necessarily as a stopgap 
measure in order to suspend trading simply until more infor-
mation can be dissemi11ated into the marketplace. The first 
of these alleged insufficiencies is no more than a reiteration of 
the familiar claim of many government agencies that any 
semblance of an adversary proceeding will delay the imposi-
tion of the result which they believe desirable. It seems to us 
that Congress, in weighing the public interest against the 
burden imposed upon private parties. has concluded that 10 
days is sufficient for gathering necessary evidence. 
This very case belies the Commission's argument that 
injunctions cannot be sought in appropriate cases. At exactly 
the same time the Commission commenced the first series of 
suspension orders it also sought a civil injunction against CJL 
and certain of its principals, alleging violations of the registra-
tion and antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1933, violations of the antifraud and reporting provisions 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and various other 
improper practices, including the filing of false reports with 
the Commission and the dissemination of a series of press 
releases containing false and misleading information. App. 
109. And during the second series of suspension orders, the 
Commission approved the filing of an action seeking an in-
junction against the management of CJL to prohibit them 
from engaging in further violations of the Act. App. 101. 
The second of these alleged insufficiencies is likewise less 
than overwhelming. Even assuming that it is proper to sus-
pend trading simply iu order to enhance the information in the 
76-1607-0PINION 
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marketplace, there is nothing to indicate that the Commission 
cannot simply reveal all its information to the investing public 
at the end of 10 days and then let the investors make their own 
judgments. 
Even assuming, however, that a totally satisfactory remedy-
at least from the Commission's viewpoint-is not available in 
every instance in which the Commission would like such a 
remedy, we would not be inclined to read § 12 (k) more 
broadly than its language and the statutory scheme reasonably 
permit. Indeed, the Commission's argument amounts to little 
more than the notion that ~ 12 (k) ought to be a panacea for 
every type of problem which may beset the marketplace. This 
does not appear to be the first time the Commission has 
adopted this construction of the statute. As early as 1961 a 
recognized authority il1 this area of the law called attention to 
the fact that the Commission was gradually carrying over the 
summary suspension power granted in the predecessors of 
§ 12 (k) into other areas of its statutory authority and using 
it as a pendente lite power to keep in effect a suspension of 
trading pending final disposition of delisting proceedings. II 
Loss, Securities Regulations 854-855 (1961 ed.). 
The author then questioned the propriety of extending the 
summary suspension power in that manner. id., at 854, and we 
think those same questions arise when the Commission argues 
that the summary suspension power should be available not 
only for the purposes clearly contemplated by § 12 (k), but 
also as a solution to virtually any other problem which might 
occur in the marketplace. We do not think § 12 (k) was 
meant to be such a cure-all. It provides the Commission with 
a powerful weapon for dealing with certain problems. But its 
time limit is clearly and precisely defined. It cannot be 
judicially or administratively extended simply by doubtful 
arguments as to the need for a greater duration of suspension 
orders than it allows. If extension of the summary suspension 
power is desirable, ,the proper source of that power is Congress. 
' . 
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Cf. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 
726, 744-745 (1973). 
The Commission next argues that its interpretation of the 
statute--that the statute authorizes successive suspension 
orders-has been both consistent and longstanding, datiug 
from 1944. It is thus entitled to great deference. See United 
States v. National Assn. of Securities Dealers, 422 U. S. 694, 
719 (1975); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974). 
While this undoubtedly is true as a general principle of law, 
it is not an argument of sufficient force in this case to overcome 
the clear contrary indications of the statute itself. In the first 
place it is not apparent from the record that on any of the 
occasions when a series of consecutive summary suspension 
orders was issued the Commission actually addressed in any 
detail the statutory authoriza.tion under which it took that 
action. As we said just this Term in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. 
United States, slip op. 11 n. 5 (Jan. 10, 1978): 
"This lack of specific attention to the statutory authori-
zation is especially important in light of this Court's 
pronouncement in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 
140 (1944), that one factor to be considered in giving 
weight to an administrative ruling is 'the thoroughness 
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, 
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and 
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking 
power to control.' " 
To further paraphrase that opinion, since this Court can only 
speculate as to the Commission's reasons for reaching the con-
clusion that it did, the mere issuance of consecutive summary 
suspension orders, without a concomitant exegesis of the 
statutory authority for doing so, obviously lacks "power to 
persuade" as to the existence of such authority. Adamo 
Wrecking Co. v. United States, supra, a.t 11 n. 5. Nor does the 
existence of a prior administrative pradice, even a well-
explained one, relieve us of our responsibility to determine 
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whether that practice is consistent with the agency's statutory 
authority. 
"The construction put on a statute by the agency charged 
with administering it is entitled to deference by the courts, 
and ordinarily that construction will be affirmed if it has 
a 'reasonable basis in law.' NLRB v. Hearst Publica.-
tions, 322 U. S. 111, 131; Unemployment Commission v. 
Arayon, 329 U. S. 143, 153-154. But the courts are the 
final authorities on issues of statutory construction, FTC 
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U. S. 374, 385~ and 'are not 
obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance 
of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent 
with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congres-
sional policy underlying a statute.' NLRB v. Brown, 380 
U. S. 278, 291." Volkswagenwerk v. Federal Maritime 
Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261,292 (1968). 
And this is just such a case-the construction placed on the 
statute by the Commission , though of longstanding, is, for the 
reasons given in Part III-A of this opinioll, inconsistent with 
the statutory mandate. We explicitly contemplated just this 
situation in Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, 
Inc., 411 U. S. 726, 745-746 (1973) , where we said: 
"But the Commission contends that since it is charged 
with administration of the statutory scheme, its construc-
tion of the statute over an extended period should be 
given great weight . . . . This proposition may, as a 
general matter, be conceded, although it must be tempered 
with the caveat that an agency may not bootstrap itself 
into an area in which it has no jurisdiction by repeatedly 
violating its statutory mandate.'' 
And our clear duty in such a situation is to reject the adminis-
trative interpretation of the statute. 
Finally, the Commission argues that for a variety of reasons 
Congress should be considered to have approved the Commis-
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CoJJgress re-enacted the summary suspension power without 
disapproving the Commission's construction, but the Commis-
sion participated in the drafting of much of this legislation 
and on at least one occasion made its views known to Congress 
in committee hearings.8 Furthermore, at least one committee 
indicated on one occasion that it understood and approved of 
the Commission's practice.0 See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 
8 In 1963, when Congress was con~idering the former § 15 (c) (5), which 
extended the Commis::;ion':; summary suspension powrr to securities traded 
in the over-the-counter market, the Commission informed a Subcommittee 
of the House Conunittee on Interstllte nnd Forl'ign Commerce of its 
current administrative practice. One paragraph in. their 30-page report 
to the subcommit.tl'e reads as follows: 
"Under sf'ction 19 (a) (4), the Commission has issued more than one 
suspf'n:;ion. when, upon reexamination. !~t the end of the 10-da.y period, it 
ha.;;; determined that. anot.her suspension is n.ec(':;sa.ry. At the same time 
the Commi::;sion. has recognized that suspension of trading in a security is 
a serious stf'p, and thf'reforf' has exercised the powf'r with restraint and has 
procf'Pdf'd with diligencP to df'vp]op the neces:;ary facts in order that any 
suspension can be terminated as soon as possible. The Commis::;ion would 
follow tha.t policy in administering the proposed new section 15 (c) (5) ." 
Hearing::; on H. R. G789, H. R. 6793, S. 1642 before a Subcommmittee of 
thr House Committee on Interstate and Foreign CommercE' (Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934: Investor Protection), 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 219 
(1963) . 
u ThA SNtate Committee on Banking and Currency, whf'n. it reported on 
the propo::;ed 1963 amendments to the Act., indicated that it und<:'rstood 
and did not disapprove of the Commission's practicE' . It stated: 
"The Commission has consistently construed section 19 (a) ( 4) a~; per-
mitting it to issue more than on<:' ~;uspen~;ion if, upon N>examinntjon at the 
end of the ten-day period, it determines that rmot her suspen~;ion is 
nPce::;::;ary. The committee accepts this interpretation . At. tlw same time 
the committ~ recognizes that Hu::;pension of trading in a s£>curity is a. drastjc 
Rtep and that prolonged suspension of trading may impose con::;iderable 
hardship on stockholders . The committee therefore expects that the 
Commis::;ion will exercise this poweJ; with restraint and will proceed with 
all diligencE' to develop the necessary facts in ordE'r that any suspension 
can be terminated as soon as possible." S. Rep. No. 379, 88th ·Cong., lE>i 
Scss., 66-67 (1963). 
' . 
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192 (1969); Un'ited States v. Correll, 389 U. S. 299, 305-306 
(1967); Fribourge Navigation Co. v. Cornrn'r of Internal 
Revenue, 383 U.S. 272. 283 (1966). 
While we of course recognize the validity of the general 
principle illustrated by the cases upon which the Commission 
relies, we do not believe it to be applicable here. In Zuber v. 
Allen, supra, at 192, the Court stated that a contemporaneous 
administrative construction of an agency's own enabling legis-
lation "is only one input in the interpretational equation. Its 
impact carries most weight when the administrators partici-
pated in drafting and directly made known their views to 
Congress in committee hearings." Here the administrators, so 
far as we are advised, made no reference at all to their present 
construction of § 12 (k) to the Congress which drafted the 
"enabling legislation" here in question-the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. They made known to at least one com-
mittee their subsequent construction of that section 29 years 
later. at a time when the a.ttention of the committee and of 
the Congress was focused on issues not even remotely related 
to the one presently before the Court.10 Although the section 
in question was re-enacted in 1963, and while it appears that 
the committee report did recognize and approve of the Com-
mission's practice, this is scarcely the sort of congressional 
approval referred to in Zuber, supra. 
We are extremely hesitant to presume general congressional 
awareness of the Commission's construction based only upon a 
few isolated statements in the thousands of pages of legislative 
documents. That language in a committee report, without 
additional indication of more widespread congressional aware-
ness, is simply not sufficient to invoke the presumption in a 
case such as this. For here its invocation would result in a 
10 The purpose of the 1963 amendments was merely to grant. the 
Commission t.he same power to >=ummarily deal with securities traded in the 
over-the-counter market as it alrea.dy had to deal with securities traded on 
national exchanges. The purpose of the 1975 amendments was simply to 
rom;olida.te into one section the power formerly contained in two. 
' ' 
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construction of the statute which is not only at odds with the 
language of the section in question and the pattern of the 
statute taken as a whole, but is extremely far reaching in terms 
of the virtually untrammeled and unreviewable power it would 
vest in a regula tory agency. 
Even if we were willing to presume such general awareness 
on the part of Congress. we are not at all sure that such 
awareness at the time of re-enactment would be tantamount 
to amendment of what we conceive to be the rather plain 
meaning of the language of § 12 (k). On this point the 
present case differs significantly from United States v. Correll, 
supra, where the Court took pains to point out in relying on a 
construction of a tax statute by the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue that "to the extent the words chosen by Congress cut 
in either direction , they tend to support rather than defeat the 
Commissioner's position . ... " 389 U. S. 299, 304. 
Subsequent congressional pronouncements also cast doubt 
on whether the prior statements called to our attention can be 
taken at face value. When consolidating the former§§ 15 (c) 
( 5) and 19 (a)( 4) in 1975, seen. 1. a.nte, the Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs a.lso commented 
on what became § 12 (j) , which , according to the Committee, 
would allow the Commission "to suspend [the registration of 
a security] for a period not exceeding twelve months ... after 
notice and opportunity for hearing . . ." if the Commission 
finds "that the issuer of such security has failed to comply 
with any provision of the Exchange Act or rules and regula-
tions thereunder." S. Rep. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 
105-106 (1975). The Committee went on to note that not 
only would this make unlawful any trading in any such 
security by any broker or dealer, but "[w]ith this change, the 
Commission is expected to use this section rather than its ten-
day suspension power, in cases of extended duration." Ibid. 
(emphasis added) . Thus, even assuming, arguendo, that the 
1963 statements have more force than we are willing to attrib-
ute to them, and that . as the Commission argues, § 12 (j) does 
' . 
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not cover quite as broad a. range of securities as § 12 (k), the 
1975 congressiopal statements would still ha.ve to be read as 
seriously undermining the continued validity of the 1963 
statements as a basis upon which to adopt the Commission's 
construction of the statute. 
In sum, had Congress intended the Commission to have the 
power to summarily suspend trading virtually indefinitely we 
expect that it could and would have authorized it more clearly 
than it did in § 12 (k). The sweeping nature of tha.t power 
supports this expectation. The absence of any truly per-
suasive legislative history to support the Commission's view, 
and the entire statutory scheme suggesting that in fact the 
Commission is not so empowered, reinforce our conclusion that 
the Court of Appea.ls was correct in concluding no such power 
exists. Accordingly, its judgment is 
Affirmed. 
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